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The primary objective of this paper is to study the interaction between mon-
etary policy, asset prices, and the sources of technological progress. We develop
a two sector model in which ￿nancial institutions promote risk sharing and ￿at
money alleviates trade frictions. Since the price of capital goods depends on in-
￿ ation, the Friedman Rule may be sub-optimal. In addition, di⁄erent sources of
productivity can a⁄ect the degree of risk sharing. Although the optimal money
growth rate falls in response to an increase in productivity in either sector of the
economy, monetary policy should react more aggressively to investment-speci￿c
productivity. Our results are broadly consistent with U.S. monetary policy dur-
ing the postwar period.
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11 Introduction
One of the primary goals of central banks is to determine the degree of policy inter-
vention to regulate the amount of investment activity in the economy. Obviously, pro-
ductivity growth is an important driving force for investment. However, recent work
identi￿es multiple sources of growth. Notably, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell
(1997) attribute nearly 60% of economic growth in the United States to productivity
growth in the capital sector.1 The remaining 40% stems from neutral technologi-
cal progress. Moreover, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic
(2001) demonstrate that capital embodied productivity results in lower equity prices.
This implies that the source of productivity growth in the economy bears signi￿cant
implications for the direction of asset prices and investment activity. While techno-
logical change in the capital sector can cause equity prices to fall, neutral growth
raises the demand for capital. Consequently, these arguments suggest that monetary
policy should be chosen according to the sources of technological progress.
This paper seeks to develop a framework to study the relationships between mon-
etary policy, asset prices, and technological change. In particular, our approach fea-
tures two primary elements. First, following Abel (2003), we construct an adjustment
costs model of investment in which the relative price of equipment is endogenous. Sec-
ond, individuals also encounter idiosyncratic risk.2;3 While ￿nancial institutions help
insure against such risk, monetary policy a⁄ects the e¢ ciency of risk sharing. Inter-
estingly, as the economy includes two sectors of production, the level of productivity
in each sector not only has an impact on the relative price of capital ￿it also has im-
portant implications for the degree of risk sharing that occurs. In this manner, there
are interesting connections between monetary policy and the sources of productivity
in the economy.
We proceed by providing speci￿c details about our modeling framework. As in
Schreft and Smith (1997), we construct a two-period overlapping generations model
in which individuals encounter liquidity risk and information frictions generate a
transactions role for money. In the model, individuals are born in two di⁄erent
geographically separated locations. Within each location, agents have complete in-
formation regarding others￿asset holdings. In contrast, across locations, there is
incomplete information such that individuals do not have the ability to establish and
trade claims to assets. In this manner, private information leads to a transactions
role for money. Therefore, if an individual is forced to trade outside of his location of
residence, he must liquidate asset holdings and acquire money balances. Moreover,
monetary policy a⁄ects the degree to which individuals are insured against liquidity
risk.
1In addition, they determine that the relative price of capital goods has fallen by around 3% per
year in the United States during the postwar period. See also the discussion in Jones (1994).
2Abel (2003) studies the e⁄ects of aggregate uncertainty from random population growth on asset
prices. In his work, demographic shocks a⁄ect the price of capital goods.
3In Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, both neutral and capital-embodied productivity shocks
occur. However, they study a representative agent, in￿nite-horizon economy. Consequently, idiosyn-
cratic shocks do not take place and there is no role for risk sharing between groups of individuals.
2In addition to two separate locations, we consider a production economy in which
there are two di⁄erent production sectors: a consumer goods sector and a capital
sector. In the capital sector, ￿rms incur adjustment costs and the equilibrium price
re￿ ects decisions by two di⁄erent groups of participants in the market. On the supply
side, ￿rms produce capital in order to maximize pro￿ts. On the demand side, ￿nancial
institutions (which we refer to as banks) seek to acquire capital goods based upon the
degree of liquidity risk and anticipated earnings from capital. In particular, banks
choose diversi￿ed portfolios of assets in order to provide risk pooling services. In
this manner, the attitudes of individuals regarding their tolerance for risk will a⁄ect
portfolio choices.
As a benchmark, we study an economy in which individuals￿demand for money is
inelastic and production in each sector is of the Cobb-Douglas form. In this setting,
the Fisher equation holds and in￿ ation only a⁄ects the value of real balances. While
monetary policy does not a⁄ect the demand for money, it does a⁄ect the e¢ ciency
of risk-sharing in the economy. Moreover, the resulting degree of tractability allows
us to easily evaluate the determinants of the price of capital and its rate of return.
Although individuals in our framework engage in risk-sharing, the predictions from
the benchmark model are consistent with the insights provided in the literature on
investment-speci￿c technological change. That is, the direction of productivity in
each sector of the economy a⁄ects the direction of asset prices and the amount of
investment.
To begin, neutral productivity raises the productivity of capital. Following the
logic of Tobin￿ s Q (Tobin 1969), neutral productivity increases the value of the exist-
ing capital stock and generates more demand for capital goods. In turn, the increase
in capital accumulation expands the productive capacity of the capital sector. Due
to the availability of capital, neutral progress does not a⁄ect the price of capital or
the value of Q (the rate of return to capital) ￿the net impact comes from additional
capital accumulation. While expected income is higher when neutral productivity is
higher, the degree of risk sharing remains the same. In contrast, in response to an
increase in productivity in the capital sector, the supply of capital will be higher.
In turn, the price of capital goods falls. However, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell, Q does not react to capital-embodied productivity.
Interestingly, these results indicate that the extent of risk sharing is independent
of stock prices and productivity in either sector of the economy. Consequently, opti-
mal monetary policy does not depend on equity prices. However, optimal policy does
provide full insurance against liquidity risk ￿this policy is the Friedman Rule.4 Nev-
ertheless, capital accumulation responds more to technological change in the capital
sector than neutral progress. Through higher levels of savings, expected income will
also grow more.
While the benchmark setup provides a tractable framework to study the relation-
4Reed and Waller (2006) study an endowment economy in which information frictions prevent
individuals from establishing insurance contracts. In this setting, ￿at money allows risk sharing to
occur. In their model, the Friedman Rule is also the optimal monetary policy since it leads to e¢ cient
risk sharing.
3ships between stock prices, productivity, and risk sharing in the economy, it fails to
generate two important predictions concerning the impact of monetary policy. First,
since money demand is inelastic, the Fisher equation holds. Yet, a wide array of ev-
idence appears to reject the Fisher hypothesis. For example, using aggregate values
of the New York Stock Exchange, Fama and Schwert (1977) conclude that in￿ ation
leads to lower nominal equity prices. This ￿nding receives support in a number of
cross-country studies.5 Second, monetary policy has an important impact on invest-
ment. Based upon annual data for the United States, Ahmed and Rogers (2000)
point out that in￿ ation is associated with higher levels of investment activity. This
also indicates that in￿ ation is associated with lower (real) equity returns.
In order to address the relationships between in￿ ation and investment that appear
in the data for the United States, we proceed by examining economies in which money
demand is elastic. If households are not too risk averse, higher rates of in￿ ation lower
the demand for money since it has a higher opportunity cost. As in￿ ation leads to
more investment and capital formation, it also lowers the returns to equity. In this
setting, the model yields novel results regarding optimal monetary policy. Notably,
the Friedman Rule may not be the optimal monetary policy if the price of capital
goods responds to in￿ ation. At the Friedman Rule, money is costless to hold and
individuals are fully insured against liquidity risk. However, as the capital stock is
relatively low, the Friedman Rule may lead to an excessively high cost of investment.
As a result, it may be welfare-improving to increase the rate of money growth so that
more capital formation occurs (thereby expanding the productive capacity of the
capital sector and lowering the relative price of equipment) at the cost of incomplete
risk sharing.
In an economy with a general CES production function, interesting connections
between monetary policy and the sources of productivity emerge. For example, neu-
tral productivity raises the demand for capital goods and generates higher rates of
return to equity. If the central bank pursues the same money growth rate, general
productivity growth leads to higher expected consumption, but less risk sharing. In
return, the optimal monetary policy provides more liquidity insurance in response
to neutral technological change. By comparison, investment-speci￿c productivity
generates lower equity prices, but much higher equity returns (higher values of Q).
Consequently, capital embodied productivity further distorts risk-sharing. Therefore,
optimal policy should react more aggressively to investment-speci￿c productivity than
neutral growth. This implies that monetary policy should be designed according to
the sources of productivity in the economy. Moreover, our results are broadly con-
sistent with U.S. monetary policy during the postwar period.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the benchmark model.
Section 3 extends the analysis to an economy with elastic demand for money. Finally,
we o⁄er concluding remarks in Section 4. Most of the technical details are presented
in the Appendix.
5In economies with relatively low in￿ ation rates, Gultekin (1983) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith
(2001) also observe that in￿ ation adversely a⁄ects equity returns.
42 The Benchmark Model
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationships between monetary policy,
asset prices, and the sources of productivity in the economy. As a benchmark, we
begin by studying an economy in which individuals￿demand for money is inelastic.
The resulting degree of tractability allows us to easily evaluate the determinants of
the price of capital along with its rate of return. In this setting, we ￿nd that the
direction of productivity in each sector of the economy a⁄ects the direction of stock
prices and the amount of investment. We also examine the e⁄ects of productivity in
each sector for risk sharing and optimal monetary policy.
2.1 The Environment in the Benchmark Economy
The economy consists of two distinct geographic locations. For example, the locations
could be viewed as separate islands. Within each location, there is an in￿nite sequence
of two-period lived overlapping generations, plus an initial group of old individuals.
At the beginning of each date, a continuum of ex-ante identical young workers are






for ￿ 6= 1 (1)
u(ct) = lnct otherwise
where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. As a benchmark, we focus on
studying economies in which individuals￿demand for money is inelastic. This occurs
if the substitution e⁄ect from an increase in the return to money is exactly o⁄set by
the income e⁄ect. In our framework, this takes place when ￿ = 1:
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labor. Since there is no disutility of
labor e⁄ort, an individual￿ s labor supply is independent of wages. In contrast, agents
are retired when old. As a result, the total labor supply at each date is equal to the
total population mass of young individuals.
On each island, there are two types of ￿rms. The ￿rst type uses labor (Lt) and
capital (Kt) to produce the economy￿ s consumption good. We refer to these ￿rms as
consumer goods producers. Total output per worker produced in period t is given
by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function of the form, yt = Ak￿
y;t, where A
is an exogenous technology parameter and ky;t is capital per worker employed in the
consumer goods sector. In addition, ￿ is the capital share of total output.
In contrast, a capital ￿rm uses the consumption good and capital to produce
next period￿ s capital stock. Following Basu (1987) and Abel (2003), we adopt a log
linear speci￿cation of the classical capital production function. In particular, capital






5where it is the amount of investment per worker in period t. Equivalently, it is
the amount of the economy￿ s consumption good used as an input in the production
process. As in Kydland and Prescott (1982), it takes time to build productive capital.
In addition, kk;t is the capital stock per capita used by a capital producer. Moreover,
the parameter a measures the level of productivity in the production of new capital,
with a > 0.
On the other hand, ￿ 2 [0;1]; indicates the importance of new capital investment
relative to the existing stock of capital in producing new capital. That is, higher
values of ￿ indicate that new capital investment is more important in capital produc-
tion relative to the existing stock of capital. Equivalently, it is the investment share
of new capital production. If ￿ = a = 1, the production of capital goods becomes
identical to the one sector model with complete depreciation. Speci￿cally, one unit
of foregone consumption generates one unit of new capital.
There are two types of assets in this economy: money (￿at currency) and capital.
The monetary base per worker is given by Mt. Assuming that the price level is
common across locations, we refer to Pt as the number of units of currency per unit
of consumer goods at time t. Thus, in real terms, the supply of money per worker is
mt = Mt=Pt: At the initial date 0, the generation of old depositors at each location is
endowed with the aggregate stock K0 and the initial aggregate money stock M0 > 0:
Due to private information, depositors face a trading friction. Each island is char-
acterized by complete information about agents￿asset holdings, but communication
across islands is not possible. As a result, individuals do not have the ability to
issue private liabilities. Moreover, they are also subject to relocation shocks. The
probability of relocation, ￿, is exogenous, publicly known and is the same across
locations.
As in standard random relocation models, ￿at money is the only asset that can be
carried across locations. Furthermore, currency is universally recognized and cannot
be counterfeited ￿therefore, it is accepted in both locations. In this manner, money
facilitates transactions made di¢ cult by spatial separation and limited communica-
tion. Thus, money has an advantage over holdings of capital in terms of liquidity.
Consequently, although it is dominated in rate of return, it is accepted as a medium
of exchange on each island.
Since money is the only asset that can cross locations, depositors who learn they
will be relocated will liquidate all their asset holdings into currency. Random reloca-
tion thus plays the same role that liquidity preference shocks perform in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). As banks provide insurance against the shocks, each young depositor
will put all of her income in the bank rather than holding assets directly.
In addition to depositors, there is a monetary authority that follows a constant
money growth rule. In particular, the money stock evolves according to:
Mt+1 = ￿Mt (3)






At this juncture, we describe the timing of events at each date. For simplicity, we
consider that there are two di⁄erent stages of activity. During Stage I, trade in factor
markets occurs. In Stage II, agents born at date t deposit their funds at banks. In
turn, banks acquire portfolios of assets on behalf of their depositors. We elaborate
immediately below.
At the beginning of period t, young depositors are born. Banks receive the capital
they ordered in the previous period (which they paid Pk;t￿1 per unit). Subsequently,
banks announce the schedule of deposit rates rm;t and rn;t for deposits received in
period t. They also place orders for capital to be delivered next period, kt+1: This
pins down the amount of cash reserves to obtain, mt.
Next, consumer goods producers choose how much capital to rent from banks,
ky;t ￿
Ky;t
Lt , and how much labor to hire, Lt; to produce the economy￿ s output, yt.
Capital producers decide to rent kk;t and select an amount of investment (it) to
produce next period￿ s capital stock, kt+1.6 Investment and rental payments (rk;t) are
funded by retained earnings from the previous period. Afterwards, workers provide
labor services and production takes place at consumer goods producers. In turn, labor
and capital receive their marginal products, wt and ry;t: At the end of Stage I, banks
pay returns to non-movers with the income they earned from the rental services of
capital. A summary of events occurring in Stage I of period t is illustrated in Figure
1 below.
6The assumption that capital producers simultaneously sell and rent capital is motivated by
the expression for Tobin￿ s Q. In particular, our framework explicitly separates the market value of
capital from the replacement costs. While the market value of capital is given by the rental rate, the
replacement costs of capital are determined by the price of new capital goods.
7Figure 1: Stage I of Period t: Trade in Factor Markets
At the beginning of Stage II, workers deposit their earnings in bank accounts. Af-
terwards, old movers show up at banks to exchange their money holdings for mt￿1
Pt￿1
Pt
units of goods. The payments for money acquired in period t are ￿nanced by deposits
received from the young workers. Subsequently, banks receive monetary injections
from the central bank that are consistent with the money growth rule, Mt+1 = ￿Mt:
With the remaining amount of deposits, banks pay for capital purchases. Then, old
agents consume and die. Finally, young individuals learn their location status for the
next period. Individuals who must trade in the other island liquidate their deposits
and acquire money balances from banks. Relocation occurs and period t ends. A
sketch of the events in Stage II is summarized in Figure 2 below.
8Figure 2: Stage II of period t: Acquisition of Money Balances
2.2 Trade
2.2.1 The Capital Sector
A typical capital producer chooses the amount of inputs to maximize its pro￿ts. The
problem is given by:
Max
kk;t;it







A capital producer rents capital up to the point where the marginal revenue from
one additional unit of capital is equal to its marginal cost. The marginal bene￿t from
using one additional unit of capital, kk;t is equal to the increase in revenue, Pk;t
@kt+1
@kk;t .










As the rental cost of capital rises, the demand for capital by a capital producer falls.
Furthermore, as a capital ￿rm becomes more productive (higher a), the marginal
bene￿t from using capital rises. In turn, the ratio of capital to investment increases.
Equivalently, the rental cost of capital can be de￿ ated by its purchase price to obtain
the e⁄ective rental cost,
rk;t
Pk;t.
Similarly, each capital ￿rm chooses the amount of investment such that the mar-
ginal revenue from one additional unit of investment is equal to its marginal cost.
9The marginal revenue is equal to the value of additional units of capital produced
with one additional unit of the consumption good, Pk;t
@kt+1
@it . However, the marginal






Moreover, the pro￿t maximizing choice of investment requires the relative cost of one
unit of investment, 1














Clearly, the marginal revenue from one additional unit of investment rises with the
productivity parameter a. Consequently, the investment to capital ratio increases.
Furthermore, combining both ￿rst order conditions, (6) and (7), generates the















As in standard Cobb Douglas production functions exhibiting constant returns to
scale, the MRTS depends only on the ratio of factor inputs and not on the scale of
production.
Upon substituting the expression for the MRTS into the pro￿t-maximizing factor
choices by a capital producer, (6) and (7), we get the following condition on the





















When this condition is satis￿ed, a capital producer is indi⁄erent between renting an
additional unit of capital and using an additional unit of investment to produce new
equipment. Notably, since the price of investment is equal to one, this condition
reduces to a relationship between the purchase price of capital and its rental cost.
As a result, the rental cost of capital is positively related to the replacement cost of
capital.
Finally, for a given amount of capital rental, we get an expression for the supply











10The quantity of capital produced by a capital ￿rm depends on its price and the
amount of capital rented. Clearly, the supply of capital is positively related to its
price (Pk;t) and the quantity of capital (kk;t) it seeks to rent. In addition, for a given
price of equipment, a ￿rm￿ s output rises as the sector becomes more productive.
2.2.2 The Consumer Goods Sector
Analogous to the capital sector, consumer goods producers operate in a perfectly
competitive market. By constant returns to scale in the consumption good technology,
the wage rate per worker is expressed as:
wt = Af (ky;t) ￿ ky;tAfk (ky;t) = wt (ky;t) = (1 ￿ ￿)Ak￿
y;t (12)
Moreover, the rental rate paid by a consumer good producer in period t is:
ry;t = A￿k￿￿1
y;t (13)
2.2.3 A representative bank￿ s problem
Due to perfect competition in the deposit market, banks choose portfolios to max-
imize the expected utility of each depositor. Since ￿nancial intermediaries reduce
depositors￿consumption variability, each of them chooses to deposit all of their in-
come. The bank promises a gross real return rm
t if the young individual will be
relocated and a gross real return rn
t if not.
As of period t, a bank determines the amount of real money balances to hold, mt:
In addition, it chooses how much capital to purchase from ￿rms at the market price,
Pk;t. This is equivalent to choosing how much capital to rent out to capital ￿rms,
kk;t+1 and to the consumer goods sector, ky;t+1, in t+1. Moreover, given that banks
are the sole suppliers of capital, kt+1 = kk;t+1 + ky;t+1. The bank￿ s balance sheet is
expressed by:
mt + Pk;tkt+1 ￿ wt ; t ￿ 0 (14)
Announced deposit returns must satisfy the following constraints. First, since
currency is the only asset that can be transported across locations, relocated agents
will choose to liquidate their asset holdings into currency. Depending on the bank￿ s
money holdings and the in￿ ation rate, the return to movers satis￿es:
￿rm




In addition, we choose to study equilibria in which money is dominated in rate
of return. Therefore, banks will not carry money balances between periods t and
t + 1. The bank￿ s total payments to non-movers are therefore paid out of its return
to capital in t + 1:
(1 ￿ ￿)rn
t wt ￿ rk;t+1kk;t+1 + ry;t+1ky;t+1 (16)
11Thus, each bank chooses values of rm
t ;rn
















subject to (14), (15), and (16), with ￿ = 1.
A typical bank rents capital to both sectors as long as it yields the same rate of
return. That is,
rk;t+1 = ry;t+1 = rt+1 (18)












t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Ak￿
y;t (20)
As agents have log preferences, the income and substitution e⁄ects from a change in
the rate of return to capital exactly o⁄set each other. Consequently, as observed in
(20), total expenditures on capital are independent of its rate of return. Since total
expenditures do not depend on the price of capital, the demand for capital will be
lower if its purchase price (Pk;t) is higher. By comparison, the demand for capital
will be higher if ky;t is higher. This results from the complementarity between capital
and labor in the consumer goods sector ￿if workers have access to more equipment,
they earn higher wages. Due to higher earnings, individuals deposit more funds in
the bank and investment will be higher. In addition, if agents are less likely to be
relocated, there is less need for banks to insure agents against liquidity shocks in the
economy. As a result, expenditures on capital will increase.
By the marginal rate of technical substitution in the consumer goods sector, we
can eliminate ky;t from the bank￿ s demand for capital. This is achieved by using the
return from the consumer goods sector, (13). In particular, the demand for capital


























The intuition behind equation (21) is analogous to that of (19). In particular, as
the rental cost of capital rises, the demand for capital and labor declines. This occurs
because capital and labor are complementary inputs. As a result, wages (deposits)
fall, thereby lowering banks￿demand for capital.
With remaining deposits after payments to purchase capital, the bank acquires
real money balances. In particular, using the bank￿ s balance sheet, (14), and the
demand for capital, (19), the demand for real money balances is:











As the income and substitution e⁄ects of a change in the return to money exactly
o⁄set each other, the demand for real money balances is perfectly inelastic with
respect to in￿ ation. That is, the bank allocates a constant fraction of its deposits
into cash reserves. In contrast, a higher rental rate lowers the demand for money
since it is associated with lower wages and deposits.

















are the gross real rates of return to money and capital
respectively. From equation (24), the return to non-movers is equal to Qt+1.
As denoted, we de￿ne Qt to be the return to capital in the model. This follows
Tobin￿ s theory of investment in which Q is essentially a measure of the returns to
capital. According to Tobin, one important aspect of overall investment is the market
valuation of ￿rms￿existing capital stock. In our model, the market value of capital
is given by the rental rate.7 The second component of investment behavior is the
replacement cost of capital. This is given by the purchase price of new capital goods,
Pk;t: In contrast to Tobin￿ s model, we pursue a general equilibrium theory of invest-
ment behavior. In particular, both components of investment behavior are jointly
determined.
2.3 General Equilibrium
We now combine the results of the preceding section and characterize the equilibrium
for the benchmark economy. In equilibrium, labor e⁄ort receives its marginal product,
(12), and the labor market clears:
Lt = 1 (25)
Furthermore, the price of capital is expressed by (10). Moreover, capital must earn
the same return in both sectors, (18), and the capital market clears. In particular,
the supply of capital by capital ￿rms, (11); must be equal to the demand for capital
by banks, (21), with kt = kk;t + ky;t.
As mentioned in the previous section, the expression for the supply of capital,
(11), does not take into account the pro￿t maximizing choice of how much capital to
7In standard Q-Theory models of investment, the market value of a ￿rm￿ s existing capital stock
re￿ ects its discounted ￿ ow of revenues. However, in our overlapping generations model, capital
depreciates completely each period. Hence, total income from capital is equal to rental income.
13rent. Since capital is a predetermined variable, we can use the demand for capital




















Intuitively, for a given stock of capital input and a given price of capital, we observe
the following. As the rental cost of capital to a consumer goods producer rises, its
demand falls. Since capital is a state variable, the remaining quantity available to a
capital ￿rm increases. Consequently, a capital ￿rm￿ s output rises. In contrast, the
demand for capital is expressed by equation (21):
Finally, the money market must clear in equilibrium. In particular, we can
combine the evolution of real money balances, (4); with the demand for cash by










Equivalently, we can de￿ ate the rental cost of capital by the purchase price of equip-














The steady-state behavior of the economy is characterized by the capital market
clearing conditions. To begin, note that there are essentially two distinct markets
for capital. We refer to the ￿rst market as the market for new capital goods. Please
refer to the upper-left quadrant of Figure 3 for a graph representing activity in this
market.
14Figure 3: A Partial Equilibrium Perspective of the Benchmark Economy
In the market for equipment, capital-producing ￿rms choose how much to produce,










In Figure 3, the capital supply curve is upwards-sloping. Since higher values of Pk
raise the marginal revenue from producing another unit of capital, capital producers






As previously mentioned, banks allocate a particular amount of deposits to expendi-
tures on capital. That is, total expenditures on capital do not depend on Pk. This
leads to the downward-sloping demand curve for capital in the economy ￿since to-
tal expenditures on capital are ￿xed, higher prices translate into a lower quantity of
capital demanded. The demand curve for banks is also depicted in Figure 3.
An equilibrium in the output market is a pair (P￿





k;w): Consequently, given activity in other sectors of the economy, k￿ and P￿
k
are pinned down in the market for new capital goods.
15We refer to the second market for capital as the rental market. Please refer to
the upper-right quadrant of Figure 3 for a graph representing activity in this market.
In contrast to the market for new capital goods, banks rent capital to consumer and





The price of new equipment and wages determine the position of banks￿supply in
the rental market. In particular, the supply curve is represented by a horizontal line
in the rental market ￿this occurs since banks￿portfolio choices are independent of
the return from capital.
We now turn to the demand for capital by capital and consumer goods producers.







In contrast, the demand curve by capital producers depends upon their anticipated







As a result, it is clear that the rental demand curve is downward-sloping ￿as the
rental rate rises, both types of ￿rms choose to rent less capital inputs.
Finally, note there is another equilibrium condition to take into account. This is






The graphical representation of the no-arbitrage curve is shown in the bottom, right-
hand side of Figure 3. There are two important components of its graph. First,
in order for capital producers to remain indi⁄erent between using another unit of
investment or renting another unit of capital, Pk must be increasing in r. Second,
the relationship is strictly concave ￿if Pk falls from a relatively high initial price level,
the adjustment in the rental rate must be stronger. Finally, the bottom left-hand
quadrant in Figure 3 connects the equilibrium price of capital in the output market
to the no-arbitrage curve.
As we will discuss below, our representation of activity in the steady-state using
both the rental price of capital and the price of new equipment allows us to draw a
number of insights into the behavior of the economy. However, since it involves four
endogenous variables, the four variable system renders it di¢ cult to prove existence
of steady-state equilibrium. Consequently, we choose to reduce the system to two
variables: Q ￿ r
Pk (the return to capital) and k (the steady-state stock of capital).














































We start by describing the supply of capital in the steady-state.
The Supply of Capital As a ￿rst step, we substitute the expression for Pk









where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿








1￿￿. In order to guarantee a pos-
itive supply of capital, we shall consider cases in which Q > (1 ￿ ￿). It follows that
the supply of capital is strictly decreasing in its e⁄ective rental cost. As Q ￿ r
Pk;
higher values of the rental cost imply that capital producing ￿rms will choose to rent
less capital from banks. In turn, the supply of capital will be lower as the e⁄ective
rental cost of capital is higher. Moreover, without loss of generality we assume that
(1 ￿ ￿) < 1
￿: The supply of capital is illustrated in Figure 4.
The Demand for Capital From the no-arbitrage and rate of return conditions,
we obtain the demand for capital:






As shown in (34), the demand for capital is strictly decreasing in its rate of return.
The reasoning is as follows. By the expression for the rate of return to equity,
(32), the real return to capital is increasing in its rental rate. If the rental rate
is higher, consumer goods producers will choose to rent less capital. Due to the
complementarity between labor and capital in the consumer goods sector, wages will
be lower. This causes deposits to fall and leads to less demand for capital by banks.
In addition, by the no-arbitrage condition in the capital goods sector, (31), the price
of new equipment increases if the rental rate is higher. In turn, the demand for
capital by banks declines further. Consequently, the demand for capital is decreasing
17in its rate of return. Please refer to Figure 4 for an illustration of the demand curve.
Proposition 1. Suppose that (1 ￿ ￿) < 1
￿: Under this condition, a steady-state




1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿).
Following arguments in the appendix, the supply and demand for capital always
intersect once for all Q > (1 ￿ ￿). Moreover, we also seek to study steady-states
in which money is dominated in rate of return. As a benchmark, suppose that
both assets yield the same rate of return. That is, Q = 1
￿: Upon substitution into









1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿); the rate of return to
capital is not high enough to clear the market. While the relatively high price of
new capital (Pk) encourages capital producers to supply large amounts of equipment,




1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿), the
supply of capital exceeds its demand. Consequently, the rate of return (Q) must rise
to clear the market. This leads to a higher rate of return to capital than money.
Moreover, at Q > Q￿, there is excess demand for capital since capital is relatively
less expensive to acquire. However, since capital rental is quite costly, capital ￿rms
choose to produce relatively less equipment. Thus, the steady-state is unique. These
properties are illustrated in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4. Steady State Equilibrium Under Inelastic Demand for
Money
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In standard random relocation models such as Schreft and Smith (1997, 1998),
the price of capital is exogenously set to unity. This is equivalent in our model to
the case where a = ￿ = 1: Our framework generalizes these models to incorporate
two sectors of production along with adjustment costs in the capital sector. This
enables us to examine the interaction between asset prices and di⁄erent sources of
productivity in the economy. In the discussion below, we draw interesting connections
between technological change, stock prices, and the degree of risk sharing.
We begin with the following observation:
Corollary 1. Monetary policy is superneutral. That is, with the exception of the
rate of return to money, in￿ation does not have any real e⁄ects.
When agents have log preferences, the demand for real money balances is perfectly
inelastic with respect to in￿ ation. From a typical bank￿ s balance sheet, (14), this also
implies that in￿ ation does not have any impact on the demand for capital. Therefore,
the Fisher equation holds. While monetary policy does not have any impact on the
amount of money balances, it does a⁄ect the degree of risk sharing. At higher in￿ ation
rates, the return to money is lower. Consequently, individuals receive less insurance
against liquidity risk.
Since monetary policy does not a⁄ect portfolio choices under logarithmic prefer-
ences, it provides a simple means to evaluate the determinants of the price of capital
and its rate of return. Although individuals engage in risk-sharing, the predictions
from our framework are consistent with the literature on investment-speci￿c tech-
nological change. Notably, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel (1997) point out
that the relative price of capital goods has fallen around 3% per year in the United
States. In their work, they attribute the price decline to technological advances in
the production of new equipment. The following Corollary characterizes the impact
of increasing productivity in the capital sector:
Corollary 2. Investment-speci￿c productivity lowers the (replacement cost) price
of capital goods. Furthermore, the steady-state capital stock is higher in economies
19with a more productive capital sector. However, the rate of return to capital is unaf-
fected.
To gain deep insights into the e⁄ects of investment-speci￿c productivity, we begin
by reviewing the framework introduced in Figure 3. We initiate our discussion by
describing activity in the market for new capital goods. As a result of the higher
level of productivity among capital producers, the supply curve of these ￿rms shifts
up. (Please refer to Figure 5 below)
Figure 5. Partial Equilibrium E⁄ects of Investment-Speci￿c Technological
Advance
This causes the price of new capital to fall. In turn, the supply of capital by banks
in the rental market is higher. In particular, it shifts up to point B in which the total
amount of capital produced and rented is the same in both markets. Due to the higher
supply of capital, the rental rate falls as well. The decline in both the purchase
and rental costs of capital maintains the no-arbitrage relationship among capital
producers. All of this activity takes place assuming that deposits are unchanged.
20However, because the capital stock is higher, workers in the consumer goods sector
have additional capital to work with. Since capital raises workers￿productivity, all
individuals earn higher wages. Therefore, bank deposits will increase due to higher
savings. This further spurs investment and capital accumulation in the economy.
Consequently, investment-speci￿c productivity will have an impact on both the
capital demand curve (34) and the supply curve (33). The impact through the supply
curve is demonstrated in the graph of the output market in Figure 5.
The presence of a in the capital demand curve comes from two sources. The
￿rst e⁄ect is a partial equilibrium e⁄ect ￿since higher productivity leads to a lower
price, it generates an increase in the quantity of capital demanded by banks. The
second e⁄ect is a general equilibrium e⁄ect ￿increased capital accumulation leads
to an increase in deposits. Figure 6 below shows the net impact on the rental rate
and purchase costs. Although the capital supply curve shifts out in response to the
technological change in the capital sector, the demand curve shifts out by the same
magnitude. In this manner, the return to capital remains the same. This implies
that the rental rate falls by the same amount as the purchase costs.
Thus, the return to capital does not respond to investment-speci￿c productiv-
ity. From the no-arbitrage condition, equation (31), banks will continue to purchase
additional capital until ￿rms are indi⁄erent between renting an additional unit of
capital or allocating an additional unit of revenues to investment. As banks purchase
additional capital, the rental rate falls. Consequently, capital accumulation increases
from k1 to k2 in the Figure.
Figure 6: E⁄ects of Higher Productivity in the Capital Sector
While the relative price of capital falls in response to investment-speci￿c technological
21change, the decline in the rental rate leads to lower earnings from capital investment.
As a result, the return to capital remains the same.
Therefore, investment-speci￿c technological change fuels investment and capital
accumulation. Notably, Greenwood et. al. attribute nearly 60% of economic growth
in the United States to productivity growth in the capital sector. The remaining
40% stems from neutral technological progress. Although ￿nancial institutions allow
individuals to engage in risk-sharing, our model is consistent with predictions from
the literature on investment-speci￿c technological change. That is, the direction of
productivity in each sector of the economy a⁄ects the direction of stock prices and
the amount of investment. From equation (36), it is clear that both the level of
neutral productivity (A) and investment-speci￿c productivity (a) lead to an increase
in capital accumulation and higher expected income. However, as Q does not react
to the level of productivity in either sector, the results from the benchmark setup
indicate that the extent of risk sharing is independent of stock prices and investment.
Nevertheless, capital accumulation responds more to technological change in the cap-
ital sector than neutral progress. Through higher levels of savings, expected income
will grow more.
As demonstrated, the degree of tractability in the benchmark economy generates
closed-form solutions for Q and other endogenous variables. However, since the Fisher
equation holds, the monetary side of the economy is separate from real activity. In
this setting, monetary policy only in￿ uences the cost of liquidity risk. The optimal
policy is associated with full insurance ￿this policy is the Friedman Rule.
In order to determine the e⁄ects of monetary policy on Q and investment behavior,
we must allow for the portfolio choices of ￿nancial institutions to respond to rates of
return. That is, we need to consider the e⁄ects of monetary policy on asset prices
in economies with elastic demand for money. Following standard random relocation
models, we retain the assumption that capital completely depreciates after production
occurs.
3 Economies with Elastic Demand for Money
3.1 The Model with a High Degree of Risk Aversion
A key departure from the benchmark model occurs when agents￿coe¢ cient of relative











To make our results comparable to previous work, we follow Schreft and Smith (1998)
by assuming that agents have a relatively high degree of risk aversion. That is, ￿ > 1:
In this setting, the demand for real money balances is increasing in the rate of return
to capital. This re￿ ects depositors￿attitudes regarding risk. Notably, the relocation
shock is responsible for agents to experience two di⁄erent location states ￿a ￿ good￿
22state in which they earn a relatively high rate of return and a ￿ bad￿state in which
they earn a low rate of return. If ￿ > 1 as in Schreft and Smith (1998), depositors are
particularly sensitive to low levels of consumption in the bad state. If the return to
capital is high, depositors obtain a high level of consumption in the good state. This
leads to a higher variability in their income and therefore less risk sharing. As agents
are highly risk averse, banks will seek to provide more liquidity insurance to their
depositors. This is possible if banks acquire more money balances and less capital.












The second term in the right hand side of (40) is identical to that under log preferences
(from equation (34)). However, from the ￿rst term in (40), the fraction of deposits
allocated to purchases of new capital varies with its rate of return. Consequently, the
demand curve is ￿ atter if agents have elastic demand for money balances and ￿ > 1.
Proposition 2. Suppose that (1 ￿ ￿) < 1
￿. Under this condition, a steady-state





(1 ￿ ￿). Furthermore, if agents are more risk averse (as indicated by higher values of
￿), the rate of return to capital is higher. In addition, the rental cost and the price
of new equipment are higher. This leads to less capital accumulation.
As in the previous section, the supply and demand for capital always intersect
once in an economy with highly risk averse individuals. Moreover, the conditions
for existence and uniqueness from the case where ￿ = 1 are su¢ cient for existence
and uniqueness if ￿ > 1: To better understand the reasoning, please refer to Figure 7
below:
23Figure 7: Steady-State Equilibrium (￿ > 1)
Note that the steady-state rate of return in the case of log preferences (￿ = 1) is
equal to Q￿
1: In an economy in which individuals are more risk averse (￿ > 1), banks
will acquire greater money balances in order to provide more liquidity insurance.
Therefore, at Q = Q￿
1, the demand for capital goods will be lower if ￿ > 1 compared
to the log case. This implies that there will be an excess supply of capital if Q = Q￿
1: In
order for the economy to be in equilibrium, the e⁄ective price of capital goods (Pk=r)
must fall so that capital ￿rms will lower their amount of production. Consequently,
the steady-state rate of return must be higher than Q￿
1 if ￿ > 1: Thus, if a steady-state
exists in an economy where ￿ = 1, then it also exists if ￿ > 1:
At this juncture, we discuss the impact of monetary policy on asset prices and
real equity returns. While in￿ ation did not have any real e⁄ects in the benchmark
economy, the following Proposition demonstrates that the Fisher hypothesis fails to
hold under higher degrees of risk aversion:
Proposition 3. Higher rates of money growth lead to higher prices of capital
goods. However, the marginal product of capital and the return to equity are also
higher. Nevertheless, in￿ation adversely a⁄ects capital formation.
In this economy, monetary policy a⁄ects the need for banks to provide insurance
against liquidity risk. In particular, under a higher in￿ ation rate, the return to money
is lower. As a result, banks demand more cash reserves to compensate their highly
risk averse depositors for the loss in purchasing power in the bad state. Therefore,
24they purchase less capital for a given rate of return. This causes the demand curve
in Figure 8 to shift back.
At the rate of return Q￿
A, the capital market is in excess supply. Consequently, the
relative cost of capital (Pk=r) must fall in order to clear the market. As illustrated
in the Figure, the steady-state of the economy moves from A to B: In the economy
with higher in￿ ation, B, the capital stock is lower and its marginal product is higher.
Although the relative cost (Pk=r) is lower, the price of new capital will be higher. This
is observed by the no-arbitrage condition in the rental market, (31). Furthermore,
since the return to capital is higher in economy B, this implies that in￿ ation also
leads to less risk sharing.
Figure 8: The Impact of Higher In￿ ation (￿ > 1)
Notably, many monetary models predict there should be a positive relationship
between real returns to equity and in￿ ation. In a cash-in-advance economy, Stockman
(1981) argues that in￿ ation restricts the amount of investment since money has less
purchasing power. By diminishing returns, the marginal product of capital must
be higher. In this manner, the return to capital is increasing in the in￿ ation rate.
Moreover, Schreft and Smith (1998) obtain the same result. Interestingly, when
the price of equipment is endogenously determined (as in our model), the adverse
e⁄ects of in￿ ation are magni￿ed. The intuition is as follows. If the price of capital is
exogenous and equals one as in Schreft and Smith (1998), in￿ ation operates through
two major channels. First, higher in￿ ation reduces the demand for capital since
banks seek to provide greater liquidity insurance. Second, as the capital stock falls,
25its rental rate rises. This also discourages capital accumulation. Moreover, in our
economy, in￿ ation a⁄ects capital accumulation through an additional channel ￿the
endogenous price of new capital goods. In particular, as explained in Proposition
2, the price of equipment rises with in￿ ation. This provokes banks to lower their
amount of investment. Consequently, the adverse e⁄ects of in￿ ation on expected
income are stronger if the price of capital is endogenously determined. In addition,
in￿ ation interferes with the ability of the ￿nancial sector to promote risk sharing.
This occurs because in￿ ation has a stronger e⁄ect on the return to capital in our
setting compared to the one sector economy in Schreft and Smith (1998).
Furthermore, it is important to note that the result in Corollary 2 still holds under
more general preferences. That is, the steady state capital stock increases when the
capital sector is more productive. However, as in the previous section, the return to
capital does not respond to investment-speci￿c technological change.
While the preceding discussion describes a role for monetary policy in in￿ uencing
equity returns, evidence for low in￿ ation countries such as the United States indicates
that in￿ ation simultaneously lowers equity returns and promotes capital accumula-
tion. In order to provide a framework in which money growth stimulates investment
activity, we choose to study an economy in which money demand is decreasing in the
in￿ ation rate. Such a relationship is plausible for a number of reasons. For example,
in a standard model of money demand, higher in￿ ation raises the costs of holding
money. In the discussion below, incorporating lower levels of risk aversion produces
results that are consistent with the evidence on in￿ ation, investment, and returns to
equity.
3.2 An Economy in which In￿ ation Lowers Money Demand
In the previous section, introducing relatively high levels of risk aversion yields money
demand functions which respond to monetary policy. In particular, banks provide
more liquidity insurance at higher in￿ ation rates. However, standard models of money
demand imply that in￿ ation should lower the demand for money in the economy.
Furthermore, the predictions regarding monetary policy are not in line with available
evidence for the United States. For these reasons, we turn to economies in which
agents are less risk averse. Although banks continue to provide risk pooling services,
there is less emphasis on protecting agents from low levels of consumption in the
event of relocation. At higher in￿ ation rates, liquidity insurance comes at the cost of
devoting less funds to capital. As banks choose to hold less of the dominated asset,
our results mirror standard views of money demand such as Baumol (1952) and Tobin
(1956).
Similar arguments explain the e⁄ects of the return to capital on banks￿portfolio
choices. First, as shown in the benchmark model, higher returns to capital generate
higher revenues for banks, but also imply that capital is more costly to rent. In this
manner, higher capital returns are associated with less investment since there will be
less demand for the rental services of capital. This explains the downward-sloping
demand curve for capital in the benchmark model. In contrast, in this economy,
26agents are less risk averse. Higher rates of return raise the costs of acquiring money
balances and lead to more demand for capital by banks. This provides a rationale for
an upward-sloping demand curve for capital. Therefore, as we show in the Appendix,
the demand curve for capital is backward bending. At relatively low rates of return,
the e⁄ective rental costs of capital will be low. As a result, initial increases in Q
generate an increase in the demand for capital. At higher values of Q; capital becomes
much more expensive to rent. Consequently, banks acquire less capital. This is
illustrated in Figure 9 below.
Proposition 4. Suppose that (1 ￿ ￿) < 1
￿. Under this condition, a steady state




1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿).
Avoiding unnecessary repetition, the condition for existence is identical to that in
previous sections. A graphical illustration of the steady state is presented in Figure
9 below.
Figure 9: Steady-State Equilibrium when ￿ < 1
While the Fisher hypothesis fails to hold under high degrees of risk aversion, the
e⁄ects of in￿ ation on equity returns are inconsistent with the data. In light of this
discrepancy, we consider the impact of money growth if agents are less risk averse:
27Proposition 5. Higher rates of money growth lead to lower prices (replacement
costs) of new equipment. Moreover, the marginal product of capital and its rate of
return also fall. In contrast, in￿ation leads to higher capital accumulation.
For a given real return to capital, higher in￿ ation rates raise the opportunity
cost of holding money. In turn, banks allocate a larger fraction of their deposits to
capital. This causes the demand curve for capital to shift out in Figure 10 below. At
the rate of return Q￿, the capital market is in excess demand. Consequently, the rate
of return to capital must fall in order for the market to clear. This is illustrated as a
movement from A1 to A2: In the economy with higher in￿ ation, A2, the capital stock
is higher and its marginal product is lower. Moreover, by the no-arbitrage condition
(31), the price of capital is also lower.
Figure 10: The Impact of Higher In￿ ation if ￿ < 1
Intuitively, for a given stock of capital, higher rates of money growth raise the
market value of capital relative to its replacement cost (higher value of Q). The
higher value of Q stimulates investment and capital accumulation. By diminishing
returns, income generated from capital declines. As the economy￿ s productive ca-
pacity expands, the supply of new equipment rises leading to a decline in its price.
Therefore, in￿ ation causes stock prices and real equity returns to fall.
28While in￿ ation leads to higher expected income from higher wages, it is easy
to verify that it leads to less risk sharing. That is, the return to movers declines
relative to non-movers. This occurs for two reasons. First, a higher in￿ ation rate
directly lowers the return to money and thereby, that to movers. Moreover, as banks
hold a less liquid portfolio under a higher in￿ ation rate, the return in the bad state
declines further. In contrast, since banks allocate a larger fraction of their deposits
into capital, the return in the good state does not fall as much when the return to
capital declines.
Ignoring the impact of monetary policy on the replacement cost of capital would
overstate the e⁄ects of monetary policy in most models. For example, if Pk is exoge-
nously set to unity, the bulk of a monetary expansion on equity returns is re￿ ected
through the rental rate. Since the price of new equipment is not allowed to fall with
income from capital, the e⁄ects of monetary policy are likely to be miscalculated.
This is important to consider in studying the determination of optimal monetary
policy and calculating the welfare costs of in￿ ation.
3.2.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
As noted in the introduction, much empirical research points out that in￿ ation lowers
returns to equity. Moreover, Ahmed and Rogers ￿nd evidence of a Tobin e⁄ect (Tobin
1965) for the United States. If agents are not too risk averse, our model generates the
same outcomes. As the model￿ s predictions are consistent with empirical observations,
we proceed to study the determination of optimal monetary policy. In the presence of
a Tobin e⁄ect, there are obvious trade-o⁄s ￿in￿ ation promotes capital accumulation
which increases earnings and bank deposits. However, it leads to lower rates of return
and less risk sharing ￿both the return to money and capital fall as in￿ ation rises.
We assume that the monetary authority chooses the rate of money growth to










Noting that ￿ (Q;￿) = m
w re￿ ects the fraction of deposits allocated to cash reserves,
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1 ￿ ￿
Q(￿) (43)
Using (42), (43) and the steady-state demand for cash reserves, (39), the welfare








￿￿(Q(￿);￿) : The optimal rate of money growth depends on the net

































￿2￿￿ ￿(￿) represents the social marginal cost of in￿ ation. Since
in￿ ation lowers the return to money, it directly leads to less consumption by movers.
The second term, 1
￿1￿￿￿0 (￿), re￿ ects the net social marginal bene￿t of in￿ ation. Its




@￿ , shows that the Tobin e⁄ect generates




d￿ shows that in￿ ation a⁄ects the
relative rates of return between movers and non-movers. Although in￿ ation lowers
the returns of agents in both states, the relative return to non-movers increases. In
this manner, at higher in￿ ation rates, non-movers earn higher returns at the expense
of movers.


















We obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 6. Suppose ￿ = 1
2. If ￿ > ￿
1￿￿; welfare is decreasing in in￿ation.
Consequently, the Friedman Rule is the optimal policy. However, if ￿ < ￿
1￿￿; the
optimal money growth rate exceeds the Friedman Rule.
Interestingly, Proposition 6 highlights the role of our two-sector model for devel-
oping insights into optimal monetary policy. In a standard one-sector model with
complete depreciation of physical capital, the capital stock is simply given by fore-
gone consumption in the previous period. In this sense, ￿ would be equal to one. In
addition, ￿ represents the capital intensity of the consumer goods sector. Based upon
the growth-accounting literature, it is common to set ￿ somewhere around one-third.
Therefore, the Friedman Rule is likely to be the optimal policy in standard monetary,
neoclassical growth models. However, in our framework, this is not necessarily true
￿if the capital sector is relatively capital-intensive (￿ less than one), the optimal
money growth rate exceeds the Friedman Rule.
Intuitively, at the Friedman Rule, money is costless to hold and individuals are
fully insured against liquidity risk. However, as the capital stock is relatively low,
30the Friedman Rule may lead to an excessively high cost of investment. As a result, it
may be welfare-improving to increase the rate of money growth so that more capital
formation occurs (and therefore, higher expected utility) at the cost of incomplete
risk sharing.
We proceed to study optimal monetary policy under di⁄erent degrees of technical
change. We present the following observation:
Proposition 7. The optimal monetary policy is independent of technology para-
meters.
As discussed in the previous sections, technological advance in either sector pro-
motes capital accumulation. In addition, as shown in the appendix, the elasticity of
capital with respect to in￿ ation is also independent. In this manner, the source of
technological change does not a⁄ect the degree of risk sharing in the economy and
thereby optimal monetary policy ￿this occurs regardless of the optimality of the
Friedman Rule.
3.3 The Model Under General Degrees of Substitution in the Con-
sumer Goods Sector
The preceding analysis generates a number of important observations regarding in-
vestment, stock prices, and technological change. Although individuals in the model
engage in risk-sharing, the predictions from the benchmark model are consistent with
the insights provided in the literature on investment-speci￿c technological change.
Notably, capital-embodied productivity leads to lower equity prices. Incorporating
elastic demand for money produces results in line with the available evidence on
in￿ ation, equity prices, and investment activity in the United States.
Interestingly, as the model explicitly determines both the price of new equipment
along with the rental costs of capital, our framework may be interpreted as a mon-
etary, general equilibrium model of Tobin￿ s Q theory of investment. The return to
capital is equal to the income earned from capital divided by its replacement cost ￿
Tobin￿ s Q:
Due to the increased attention to the role of the stock market for macroeconomic
activity in recent years, there have been a number of studies which derive estimates
of Q for the United States. In particular, Hall (2001) provides a time-series of calcu-
lations of Q from 1946 through 1999. From the mid 1950s to about 1970, Q generally
increased. In contrast, during the next decade, Q consistently fell. Accompanying the
surging rise of equities throughout the 1990s, measurements of Q rose substantially.
In the economy with a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the elasticity of
substitution in the consumer goods sector is equal to one. Under this speci￿cation,
the return to capital (Q) only re￿ ects the extent of liquidity risk and the willingness of
￿nancial market participants to tolerate such risk. The resulting degree of tractability
allows us to pin down parameters to determine the economy￿ s optimal monetary
31policy. Extending the model to more general elasticities of substitution introduces a
role for productivity in each sector to drive the behavior of Q: In this manner, we aim
to illustrate that it is important to consider the sources of productivity growth in the
design of optimal monetary policy. Moreover, the predictions from our analysis are
broadly consistent with U.S. monetary policy during the postwar period.
To begin, let y = A
￿
￿k￿
y + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1
￿, with ￿ 2 (0;1). The production technology







y + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1￿￿
￿ (48)




y + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1￿￿
￿ (49)





￿￿A: After some algebra, the steady state
behavior of the economy is characterized by the following two loci:8
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Proposition 8. Suppose that the level of productivity in either the consumer
goods sector or the capital sector is su¢ ciently high. If this holds, a steady-state
exists and is unique.
We next examine the e⁄ects of productivity in each sector:
Corollary 3. The e⁄ects of technological change on stock prices and equity re-
turns (Q) depend upon the source of change. At a higher level of investment-speci￿c
productivity, both the price of new capital goods and the rental costs of capital will
be lower. In contrast, under neutral progress, the price of new equipment and the
rental costs will be higher. While both sources of productivity lead to higher capital
accumulation and values of Q, investment-speci￿c productivity has a larger impact.
The results in the Corollary are intuitive. An increase in neutral productivity
stimulates deposits and investment in the economy. Therefore, it raises the market
value of capital. Since the demand for capital is higher, the rental costs of capital
and the price of new capital are also higher. In addition, rental costs increase more
than the price of new equipment. In turn, the return to capital will be higher under
8Please refer to the Appendix for details.
32higher levels of productivity in the consumer goods sector. These predictions di⁄er
from the analysis under a Cobb-Douglas production technology. That is, the demand-
induced impact of neutral productivity dominates any indirect productivity e⁄ects
from increased capital accumulation. We obtain analogous predictions for investment-
speci￿c technological change.
Interestingly, the model now produces important transmission channels for mone-
tary policy through Tobin￿ s Q. While increasing productivity in the capital sector low-
ers the cost of new capital goods, neutral productivity raises their cost. Both sources
of change raise the rate of return to capital, but Q responds more to investment-
speci￿c productivity. Therefore, capital-embodied productivity raises expected in-
come more, but further distorts risk-sharing.9
3.3.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
Analogous to the previous section, the central bank chooses the rate of money growth
to maximize the welfare of a representative generation of depositors, (41). Using some
algebra, the condition for optimal welfare becomes:10
￿ (￿) =
￿












As in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production technology in the consumer goods
sector, the Friedman Rule may be the optimal monetary policy or it may not be. If
the production technology in the consumer goods sector exhibits the more general
CES form, we are unable to ￿nd parameters which pin down the optimal money
growth rate. However, the following Proposition explains that we can characterize
how the optimal money growth rate depends on the source of productivity in the
economy:
Proposition 9. The optimal monetary policy depends upon the source of pro-
ductivity growth in the economy. In particular, the central bank￿ s response to higher
levels of productivity depends on the elasticity of equity returns with respect to tech-
nology parameters. That is, if a
Q￿
@Q￿
@a < 1 and A
Q￿
@Q￿
@A < 2￿, the optimal money
growth rate falls in response to either source of productivity. However, optimal policy
should react more aggressively to investment-speci￿c productivity.
As previously noted, advances in neutral productivity and investment-speci￿c
productivity cause the return to capital to rise. For a given money growth rate, this
9Reed and Waller (2006) study an endowment economy which includes both idiosyncratic and
aggregate production risk. In some periods, individuals receive income while in others they do not.
In the good aggregate state of the economy, individuals who obtain income receive high endowments.
In the bad aggregate state, endowments are relatively low. At moderate rates of money growth, there
is e¢ cient risk sharing in the low aggregate state, but not the high state.
10If ￿ = 0, the production technology is of the Cobb-Douglas form. As shown earlier, the optimal
in￿ ation rate is independent of technology parameters.
33leads to less risk sharing. Since agents are risk averse, the optimal monetary policy
seeks to smooth agents￿consumption across income states. Therefore, in response to
either source of productivity growth, monetary policy should provide more insurance
against liquidity risk. This occurs by pursuing lower rates of money growth in order
to raise the rate of return to money. By Corollary 3, investment-speci￿c productivity
generates much higher equity returns. Consequently, capital-embodied productivity
further distorts risk-sharing. In this manner, optimal policy should react more ag-
gressively to investment-speci￿c productivity than neutral growth. This implies that
monetary policy should be designed according to the sources of productivity in the
economy.
The predictions from the extended model line up well with the available evidence
on equity prices, Tobin￿ s Q, the e⁄ects of productivity growth, and monetary policy
in the United States during the postwar period. To draw such inferences, we rely
upon three available sources of information. First, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999)
provide data on the value of equities from 1930 until 1990. Second, Hall￿ s calculations
for Q show trends in the return to capital over time. Finally, Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Krussel (1997) compute measures of neutral and capital-embodied productivity
from the mid 1950s to about 1990.
We begin with the period from the mid 1950s to 1969. Greenwood and Jovanovic￿ s
measures of stock market capitalization show strong growth during this time period.
In the mid 1950s, the value of the stock market relative to GDP was about 40%.
In contrast, in the late 1960s, market capitalization was on average equal to GDP.
In addition, Hall￿ s calculations for Q indicate that the return to capital increased
substantially, rising from a trough near 0.5 to over 1.5 by 1969. According to Corol-
lary 3, this correlation re￿ ects strong neutral productivity growth. From the results
in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel, neutral productivity increased around 25%
during this time period. Given this information, Proposition 9 implies that the cen-
tral bank should pursue relatively low rates of money growth since expected income
should be strong. Consequently, there is greater need to provide insurance against liq-
uidity risk than to promote investment. From 1954 to 1969, average annual in￿ ation
rates were approximately equal to 2.0%.11
As widely observed, the value of equities plummeted during the next decade.
Market capitalization fell to 90% of GDP in 1970 and proceeded downward in the
early seventies. Equity prices did not rebound until around 1984. Greenwood and
Jovanovic contend that the declining value of equities could be attributed to strong
gains in capital-embodied productivity that became available. They could also be due
to strong declines in neutral productivity ￿measurements of neutral productivity fell
about 7.5%. Therefore, nearly one-third of the gains in neutral productivity that oc-
curred prior to 1970 were erased. Based upon our model, each source of productivity
generates con￿ icting predictions regarding monetary policy. On the one hand, the
central bank should pursue low rates of money growth in response to investment-
speci￿c technical change. On the other hand, declining neutral productivity should
11Authors￿calculations based upon average annual in￿ ation rates for the CPI-U from the Economic
Report of the President, 2003.
34induce higher rates of money growth in order to promote investment. Estimates of Q
imply that the return to capital fell substantially ￿from this perspective, expected
income would be falling while individuals experience greater risk sharing. In these
circumstances, in￿ ation would be expected to be higher. From 1970 to 1984, prices
grew rapidly ￿average annual in￿ ation rates exceeded 7%.
Finally, from 1984 through the late 90s, equity prices increased substantially.
The return to capital grew at a strong pace. This could be due to strong growth
in neutral productivity along with modest increases in capital-embodied technology.
Either way, Proposition 9 indicates that there should be less in￿ ation ￿expected
income is likely to be strong so the central bank should promote risk-sharing. From
1985 - 1999, average annual in￿ ation rates fell to almost 3%. Again, the model￿ s
predictions regarding equity prices, technical change, and monetary policy are in line
with economic activity in the United States.
4 Conclusions
Investment activity plays a signi￿cant role in the formulation of monetary policy.
Moreover, recent evidence identi￿es di⁄erent sources of productivity which drive in-
vestment behavior. For instance, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), at-
tribute nearly 60% of economic growth in the United States to productivity growth
in the capital sector. The remaining 40% stems from neutral technological progress.
Since each source of productivity bears di⁄erent implications for asset prices and
investment, this suggests that monetary policy should be directed according to the
sources of productivity in the economy.
In order to study the relationships between monetary policy, stock prices, and pro-
ductivity, we develop a two-sector model in which individuals encounter idiosyncratic
liquidity risk and engage in risk-sharing. Consistent with the ￿ndings of Ahmed and
Rogers (2000), we study an economy in which in￿ ation leads to more investment,
but lower equity returns. Interestingly, if the price of capital goods signi￿cantly
responds to capital accumulation, the optimal monetary policy deviates from the
Friedman Rule. Furthermore, we demonstrate that di⁄erent sources of productivity
can a⁄ect the degree of risk-sharing. In turn, optimal money growth depends on the
level of productivity in each sector. In particular, monetary policy should react more
aggressively to investment-speci￿c productivity than neutral change. Interestingly,
the predictions from our framework are in line with available evidence on economic
activity and monetary policy during the postwar period.
Our framework may be used to study a number of important issues regarding
monetary policy, asset prices, and investment. As an example, the model could
be extended to consider the implications of technological change for equity prices
and in￿ ation-targeting. If in￿ ation tax revenues fund government expenditures, the
government￿ s need to raise revenues will depend on the level of productivity in each
sector and investment. In this manner, asset prices will have a signi￿cant impact on
in￿ ation expectations.
In addition, aggregate uncertainty may also be introduced. In the current frame-
35work, risk averse individuals encounter ￿nancial uncertainty due to idiosyncratic liq-
uidity risk. Given the perfectly anticipated returns to capital, ￿nancial institutions
choose a diversi￿ed portfolio of assets to provide risk sharing opportunities. Nev-
ertheless, asset price volatility is also an important component of macroeconomic
behavior. If productivity in each sector is stochastic, ￿nancial market participants
must deal with ￿nancial risk in two forms ￿liquidity risk and uncertain stock prices.
While higher rates of money growth stimulate investment, central banks must also
construct monetary policy to help mitigate the costs of volatile equity prices. There-
fore, optimal policy should balance the desire to promote expected income while
providing insurance against asset price volatility and liquidity risk.
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385 Technical Appendix
1. Proving existence and uniqueness for all ￿ > 0. A steady-state solution for
Q is obtained by setting (33) equal to (40) :































> 0 when Q > (1 ￿ ￿). Clearly, ￿0 (Q) > 0












1￿￿. Upon substitution, we get the condition for existence in Propositions








1￿￿ line only once and the steady state is unique for all ￿ > 0.
This completes the proof that a steady-state exists and is unique for all ￿ > 0 when
1







2. Proving that Q￿ is higher when ￿ > 1 relative to ￿ = 1. As ￿0 (Q) > 0








￿>1. This is equivalent to
























D = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
1￿(1￿￿)￿
(1￿￿)￿ as observed in Figure 7.
This completes the proof.
3. E⁄ects of monetary policy: The e⁄ects of money growth on equity returns
are obtained by taking the derivative of the capital market clearing condition derived
















As explained previously, ￿0 (Q) > 0 for all ￿ > 0. As a result, monetary policy is
super-neutral when ￿ = 1. In addition,
@Q
@￿ > 0 when ￿ > 1 and
@Q
@￿ < 0 when ￿ < 1.
Equivalently, the e⁄ects of ￿ on k￿, r￿, and P￿
k follow from the e⁄ects of Q on (31),
(32), and (33). This completes the proof of Corollary 1 and Propositions 3 and 5.
4. Characterizing the demand for capital when ￿ < 1. De￿ne the fraction






In this manner, the demand for capital can be written as:






39It is easily veri￿ed that lim
Q!1
kD ! 0 and for Q = 1
￿, ￿ (Q;￿) = ￿ and kD =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
1￿(1￿￿)￿
















Clearly, the sign of @kD
@Q depends on the sign of the term in bracket. In particular
@kD




(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
Substituting for the expression of ￿, we ￿nd that @kD






(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿






@Q > 0 for Q <
^
Q and @kD
@Q < 0 for Q >
^
Q. As a result, the
demand for capital is backward bending as illustrated in Figure 9. Moreover, we
demonstrated above that the return to capital is falling in ￿. This occurs regardless of




￿. This completes the proof that the demand for capital is
backward bending when ￿ < 1.
5. Deriving !0 (￿) in equation (47): As a ￿rst step, we need to ￿nd an







Using (13) and (32), the rate of return to capital can be written as:


































Furthermore, di⁄erentiating (12) with respect to ￿ :
@w(ky)
@￿





Using the expression for ￿ and by substituting for the expressions of (56); (57), and
(58) into ￿0 (￿) we get:
40￿0 (￿) =









+ [1 ￿ ￿]￿￿1
￿
(59)
Finally, substitute for ￿(￿) and ￿0 (￿) into !0 (￿) to get (47). This completes the
derivation of (47).
6. Proof of Proposition 6: The sign of !0 (￿) depends on the sign of the term






Suppose ￿ = 1
2. Using (53); the steady-state value of Q is:
Q￿ (￿;￿) =
h
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where ￿ (￿;￿) =
￿h








































(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
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￿ (￿;￿) + 1￿￿
￿ ￿
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i. By de￿nition of ￿,
and using (42) and (43) :
V ￿
1
￿ + [￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿] 1￿￿
￿ Q￿￿
(62)
Finally, substituting for (60); (61), and (62) into the optimality condition and re-
arranging terms, we get:
LHS (￿￿;￿) = RHS (￿￿;￿) (63)
41where LHS (￿) = 2￿+[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
hh




￿ + ￿ (￿;￿)
i
and RHS (￿) =
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￿ + ￿ (￿;￿)
￿h




￿ ￿ + 4￿(1 ￿ ￿)
The optimal rate of in￿ ation, ￿￿ solves (63). In this manner we distinguish
between two di⁄erent cases. First, suppose ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ > 0. Under this condition,
@LHS(￿;￿)
@￿ < 0 and lim
￿!1 LHS (￿) ! 2￿ + 2[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
h











￿!1 RHS (￿;￿) ! 1 and lim
￿!0
RHS (￿;￿) ! 0. In this case, an interior
solution always exist as both curves always intersect. However, optimal monetary
policy generally exceeds the Friedman rule.
Next, suppose ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ < 0. Under this condition,
@LHS(￿;￿)
@￿ > 0. In addi-
tion, lim
￿!0
LHS (￿;￿) ! ￿1 and lim
￿!1
LHS (￿;￿) ! 2￿+2[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿]
h





An interior solution does not exist in this case. In particular, !0 (￿) < 0. As welfare
is falling with in￿ ation rate, the Friedman rule where Q￿￿ ’ 1 is optimal. This
completes the proof of Proposition 6.
7. Proof of Proposition 7. It is clear from (63) that technology parameters
have no e⁄ect on optimal monetary policy. This completes the proof of Proposition
7.
8. Deriving (50) and (51). The problem under CES production function can
be solved using the system of equations, (11), (14), (31), (32), (39), (48), (49), and
kk + ky = k; with 8 unknowns, ky, kk, k, Pk, r, Q, m, and w: The ￿rst step is to
reduce this system into a 3x3 system by writing r and Pk as a function of Q , using
the expression for wages, and the capital market clearing condition. In particular,
we use (31), (32); (39), (49); and kk + ky = k into (11), (14), and (48) to obtain:
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+ (1 ￿ ￿)
i 1￿￿
￿ (66)
Finally, equations (50) and (51) are generated by using (65) into (64) and (66).
This completes the derivation of equations (50) and (51):
































(Q ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿ (Q;￿))
￿
(68)
This polynomial yields the steady-state solution for Q.
De￿ne G(Q) = Q
￿











clear that G0 (Q) > 0, G(0) = 0, and lim
Q!1
G(Q) ! 1. Furthermore, J0 (Q) <
0 since
@￿(Q;￿)








(1￿￿) since ￿ ! 0 and
lim
Q!(1￿￿)
J (Q) ! 1. In this manner, both curves always intersect once and the
polynomial has a unique positive root. Consequently, a steady state exists if at Q￿






















￿(1￿￿) ￿ 1. This completes
the proof of Proposition 8.
10. Proof of Corollary 3: For a given rate of return to capital, J (Q) is






Consequently, the steady-state value of Q increases under higher levels of technology
in either sector. Moreover, it is easy to show that the capital stock rises as well.











Q + (1 ￿ ￿ (Q;￿))
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@A > 0 since
@￿
@Q < 0 and
@Q
@A > 0. A similar proof can be established for
the e⁄ects of a. We next need to show that Q rises more under investment-speci￿c
technological change. This is achieved by holding Q ￿xed and showing that J (Q)
shifts by more as a rises relative to an increase in A. As we are holding Q ￿xed,
we can ignore constant terms. In this manner, Q rises by more under sector speci￿c
growth if the condition in Corollary 3 holds.
Finally, we show the e⁄ects of di⁄erent technology parameters on r and Pk. As
discussed previously, the steady-state rate of return to capital is generated by (68).
Furthermore, using (31), (32), and the expression for   into (68):
V (Pk) = Z (Pk)


























Clearly, V 0 (Pk) > 0 and Z0 (Pk) < 0. Moreover, under higher A, Z (Pk) increases for
43a given Pk. As a result, the steady-state Pk also rises under higher A. In contrast,
under higher levels of a, Z (Pk) falls for a given Pk. Consequently Pk is declining in
a. As r and Pk are positively related by (31), this result also applies for r. This
completes the proof of Corollary 3.
11. Proof of Proposition 9: By (45), welfare is maximized when
(1￿￿)
￿ ￿(￿) =












We next need to ￿nd an expression for each term in (69).




































Finally, we can solve for k
￿
y from (50). Using the expression for k
￿
y, (70), (71); and
the derivative of (68) with respect to ￿ into (69); the optimality condition becomes:
￿ (Q(￿);￿) = ￿(Q(￿);￿) (72)

































First, it is clear that ￿(Q(￿);￿) is strictly increasing in ￿ and passes by the
origin since
@Q
@￿ < 0. Moreover, lim
￿!1￿(Q(￿);￿) ! 1 since Q ! 0 . Furthermore,
d￿(Q(￿);￿)
d￿ > 0 , lim
￿!1
￿ (Q(￿);￿) ! 1￿￿
￿ , and lim
￿!0
￿ (Q(￿);￿) ! 1
￿ + ￿
￿(1￿￿):
Suppose an interior solution exists. In this case, the optimal rate of money growth
falls under higher a if a
Q￿
@Q￿
@a < 1. This occurs because
d￿(Q(￿);￿)
da j￿=￿0 > 0 and
d￿(Q(￿);￿)





Finally, if welfare is falling with in￿ ation (!0 (￿) < 0), an interior solution does not
exist. Optimal monetary policy implies that ￿￿
FRQ￿ = 1. Since Q rises under higher
levels of technology, then ￿￿
FR must fall. This must occur as nominal equity returns
are rising with in￿ ation. That is, the direct e⁄ect of higher money growth on ￿￿
FRQ￿





the optimal in￿ ation rate under investment speci￿c growth is lower relative to neutral
change. This completes the proof of Proposition 9.
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